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Abstract 
This article is the introductory chapter of Eric Descheemaeker (ed.), The 
Consequences of Possession (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), a 
book which comprises the papers that were presented at a namesake conference 
at Old College, University of Edinburgh, in 2012 by the following scholars: Craig 
Anderson (Robert Gordon), Raffaele Caterina (Turin), Simon Douglas (Oxford), 
Yaëll Emerich (McGill), Robin Hickey (Durham), Duard Kleyn (Pretoria), Lena 
Kunz (Heidelberg) and Thomas Rüfner (Trier).  
 
The subject-matter of the book is the consequences of possession, examined 
from a comparative and historical perspective. Leaving aside the question on 
what possession is, a question that has caused a considerable amount of ink to be 
spilled for centuries (at least in the civilian tradition), it concerns itself with the 
law’s response to the recognition of a factual situation as amounting to 
‘possession’ (or an equivalent concept like ‘possessio’, ‘possession’ or ‘Besitz’). It 
is be the first attempt to look in a coherent fashion at the topic of possession in a 
comparative and historical perspective, bringing together scholars from the 
civilian tradition (Germany, Italy) as well as the common law (England) and 
mixed legal systems (Quebec, Scotland, South Africa).  
 
This introductory chapter examines four questions: 1) Why protect possession?; 
2) How is possession protected?; 3) How does the fact of possession relate to any 
rights to or of possession?; 4) What is so-called “quasi-possession”? One theme 
that is highlighted throughout the chapter is that the distance between the two 
great western legal traditions in this field might not be as great as is commonly 
believed, English law and modern civilian systems having both emerged at the 
crossroads of Roman law, canon law and feudalism. In this, the two of them 
belong to a pan-European current of concepts and doctrines which has shaped 
the modern law in all the jurisdictions examined, if in markedly different ways. 
 
Keywords 
Possession, possessio, Besitz, interdicts, rei vindicatio, Pollock and Wright, 
consequences of possession, custody, detention, detentio, possession of rights, 
quasi-possession, quasi possessio, civil possession, possessio civilis, natural 
possession, possessio naturalis, vi clam precario, Savigny, Jhering, actio spolii, 
spuilzie, corpus, animus domini, animus rem sibi habendi, animus tenendi, animus 
possidendi, interdictum de vi, interdictum uti possideti, interdictum utrubi, Gewere, 
saisine, seisin, réintégrande, complainte, ius possidendi, ius possessionis. 
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF POSSESSION 
 
Eric Descheemaeker
*
 
 
 
 
Labeo, at the turn of the Christian era, tells us that he who “sits” over a thing (res) 
possesses it.
1
 Subject to a difficulty about what sort of entities can be possessed,
2
 the 
metaphor could hardly be clearer: possession speaks of factual control, with its 
unavoidable corollary, the power to exclude others. In that sense, possession does not 
have to be invented by lawyers: it pre-exists any form of apprehension of reality by 
the interpretative and creative power of the law. This is probably the reason, or at 
least part of the reason, why it is routinely described as a raw “fact”:3 while this 
assertion needs to be severely nuanced, precisely because the intervention of the law 
is bound to bring in a degree of artificiality, it has to be our starting point both 
historically and conceptually: possession describes a relationship of factual control of 
a person over a thing. 
From a civilian perspective at least (but this is language that can also be 
understood by common lawyers, and might in fact belong to the shared, pre-legal 
intuitions of mankind),
4
 possession will invariably be contrasted with ownership: 
whether there is any underlying analytical necessity or not, any reader will know from 
experience that no analysis of either concept is allowed to continue for long without 
the other being brought in as part of an exercise in contrast and differentiation.
5
 The 
dichotomy seems indeed simple and intuitively graspable by any layman: on the one 
                                                        
* University of Edinburgh. Thanks to George Gretton and Robin Hickey for their helpful comments on 
an earlier draft of this chapter. 
1 D 41.2.1 pr. (Paul, 54 ad Edictum): “Possession is so styled, as Labeo says, from ‘seat’ (a sedibus), as 
it were ‘position’, because there is a natural holding, which the Greeks call ή, by the person who 
stands (insistit) on a thing” (tr Watson Digest); cf F Schulz, Classical Roman Law (1951) 428. The 
same metaphor can be found in German Besitz (from sitzen = to sit). Contra: J-L Halpérin, Histoire du 
droit des biens (2008) 37. 
2 The problem of the protection of incorporeals will be returned to in part D. For the sake of simplicity, 
it will be ignored until that point; and the “thing” will be assumed to be corporeal, i.e. tangible. 
3 See below, s C. 
4 The suggestion is made in A M Honoré, “Ownership”, in A G Guest (ed), Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence (1961) 107 at 107.   
5 See also below (n 48). 
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hand, the possessor says, “I have it!”; on the other, the owner claims, “it is mine!”6 
The neatness of the distinction provides us with an anchor that the artificiality of the 
law can never completely undo.  
Yet difficulties are bound to crop up almost immediately. Sooner or later, “it is 
mine” will want to translate into either “I have it” or “I want to have it”: by asserting 
ownership, the rei vindicatio seeks possession.
7
 An abstract assertion of ownership is 
no good to anyone; and no-one would dream of telling the victim of theft that he has 
no cause to complain because the thing stolen is still his, wherever it might happen to 
be on the face of the earth. As to the claim that “I sit upon Daisy”,8 my cow, it is also 
bound to cause difficulties to the lawyer who seeks to analyse it: if I have Daisy and 
no-one challenges my power to exclude them from her, it seems that private law, 
being concerned with disputes between individuals, does not have anything to say 
about what is, again, the mere description of a fact. Where it might want to intervene, 
on the other hand, is if I am challenged in my possession.  
But here, two different difficulties arise. The first one is that, as likely as not, 
Daisy has already been taken away from me: I come back to the field at night to find 
that a thief has led her astray. Unless the law artificially restricts or alters the 
layman’s understanding of possession, I am no longer the possessor; the thief is. He 
sits on her, not me. If I no longer have possession, my now extinct possession cannot 
by construction be protected: if I want to claim, prima facie it would have to be on the 
basis that I once was in possession. The alternative would be for the law to declare 
that I still am in possession and that either the thief is not, or that his newly-acquired 
possession is for some reason of lesser quality than mine: in both cases, artificiality 
                                                        
6 Non-technical terms, “have” and “be”, are used deliberately. The corresponding legal concepts, 
“possession” and “ownership”, are the product of the gradual refinement by the legal community of 
basic, pre-legal intuitions of the human mind. This is reflected in the words of the rei vindicatio, which 
did not ask whether the claimant “owned” the thing but whether it was “his”. (See P Birks, “The 
Roman law concept of dominium and the idea of absolute ownership” (1985) Acta Juridica 1at 5; 
compare the wording of the interdictum de vi armata, below xxx). 
7 It is true that English law, in particular, does not think along such lines and, subject to some nuancing, 
cannot be said to have for movables any mechanism like the rei vindicatio: failing a voluntary return of 
the thing disputed between two parties, the successful claimant will receive money damages. But it 
should not be controversial to say that the monetary award is, to use Robert Stevens’ terminology, 
“substitutive” for the value of the underlying protected legal relationship. In fact, for entirely different 
reasons, the Roman plaintiff would be left in exactly the same situation. Whether the successful 
plaintiff actually gets the res back is immaterial; the important point is that the law sees as detrimental 
the fact that the owner cannot be rejoined with it and is willing to award a remedy on that basis. 
8 The cow Daisy (occasionally renamed Buttercup) will of course evoke memories for readers familiar 
with the works of the late Peter Birks, who was Professor of Civil Law in Edinburgh from 1981-1987. 
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creeps in and drives a wedge between the layman’s and the lawyer’s understanding of 
the term.
9
 With artificiality will come complications and, often, muddle. 
The second difficulty is; why should the law care to intervene if Daisy has 
been taken away from me? One answer would be to say “because she is mine”: this 
provides at first sight a sound reason; but in that case the basis for the law’s protection 
would really be ownership, not possession past or present. Again, our seminal 
distinction between the two notions collapses. If the law wants to protect possession 
quite apart from ownership, as its rhetoric has always claimed to in systems rooted in 
Roman law, it will have to intervene whether or not Daisy is mine. This is not 
unthinkable but it does raise difficult questions. For instance, what if I am myself a 
thief; Daisy was never mine in the first place and I know it. Should I be able to appeal 
to the law – whether against the entire world, including the rightful owner, or at least 
against third parties? It seems implausible for the law to want to protect the status quo 
whenever someone sits over a thing and see his position challenged. If possession is 
not protected on the basis that it is indirectly ownership that is contemplated, it seems 
likely that other distinctions will need to be drawn, for example between good and 
bad faith,
10
 or between peaceful and violent possession. These are difficulties that will 
need returned to. What they highlight is the fact that the exercise in distinction 
between possession and ownership is not as simple as we might have thought first.  
If we move, in our attempt to define (at least provisionally) our subject-matter, 
from contradistinction to the identification of a core, more difficulties will be 
encountered, which will make it difficult to say anything about possession that would 
be uncontroversial. One particular difficulty is that the discrepancy between the 
layman’s understanding of possession (“sitting over”) and the law’s refinement of it is 
a complex one. Not only does the law not protect all instances of sitting, as one would 
expect; it frequently provides a remedy to a non-sitter under the label of possession. 
Besides, sometimes the term “possession” (possessio, possession, Besitz) is used to 
describe only such instances where the law is willing to intervene if the holding is 
challenged, and sometimes it is not. To put the same point different, possession may 
or may not mean legally protected possession; thus, depending on the context, the 
                                                        
9 Roman law chose the first branch of the alternative: D 41.2.3.7 (Paul, 54 ad Edictum). Ulpian’s 
rationalisation of the solution is puzzling: “If a person be evicted forcibly from possession, he is treated 
as still possessing, since he has the ability to recover possession by the interdict de vi” (D 41.2.17 = 
Ulpian, 76 ad Edictum; on the interdict de vi, see below, xxx). 
10 The distinction between the two types of possession was made explicitly by Paul: D 41.2.3.22 (Paul, 
54 ad Edictum). 
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qualification might but need not be redundant. This makes it particularly difficult to 
find a stable terminology, in the absence of which clear thinking will be threatened.  
Of course, the difficulty of identifying a sufficiently stable basis on which to 
build increases rapidly the moment one seeks to add a comparative (or historical) 
dimension to the study. Every comparatist will know this, and will also know that the 
extra difficulties can be more or less great, depending both on the jurisdictions under 
consideration and the proposed field of study. In this respect, few would probably 
want to deny that studying possession across the divide between the civilian tradition 
and the common law would be close to the more difficult end of the spectrum.
11
 Some 
might go as far as denying the feasibility of such a transsystemic study. The above 
starting point, approaching possession by contradistinguishing it from ownership, 
does indeed look distinctively civilian; and the very existence of the dichotomy is 
often denied in the context of English law. While the word “possession” and the 
underlying concept clearly do exist in the common-law tradition, whether they paint 
an even broadly similar picture to that of the Romanist tradition will be doubted by 
many. Although the distance might not in fact be as great as is sometimes believed, as 
indeed this book seeks to show in a number of respects, still the starting point has to 
be that the two legal traditions proceed (at least on the face of it) from significantly 
different perspectives. 
We shall come back to the issue; suffice it to say at this point that it is 
apparent from even a cursory look at modern English scholarship that the twin 
Romanist concepts of possession and ownership have sufficiently permeated the 
modern law for it to be entirely legitimate, and meaningful, to analyse the common 
law through that prism (which naturally is not to deny that the way they relate to the 
home-grown materials is a difficult and controversial issue). To a large extent, 125 
years after Pollock and Wright’s seminal Possession in the Common Law,12 the self-
understanding of modern English law has been largely recast in Roman forms of 
thinking: this might conceivably be lamented, but it cannot be denied. So, while we 
must be careful not to underestimate the distance that exists between systems of law 
with clearly diverging histories, we must be equally careful not to overstate it in the 
                                                        
11 One does not want to understate differences within the civilian tradition either; a common danger of 
focusing on the divide between the two great Western legal traditions is to imply, by contrast, that both 
sides form a block. Clearly they do not, as this chapter will make plain. 
12 Frederick Pollock & Robert Samuel Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (1888). 
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modern law, and in particular not to be overimpressed by what might be purely formal 
differences.  
At any rate, within the law of property (another Romanist concept 
appropriated by English law), it would be fair to say that possession is least open to 
the criticism of conceptual imperialism: partly because the word has belonged to the 
actional substance of the law for centuries;
13
 partly because, as mentioned at the 
outset, possession is primarily the description of a factual situation between person 
and thing which, under one name or another, is bound to exist anywhere where 
persons and things coexist. (Naturally, this is not to say that the legal refinement of 
the notion is system-neutral, which clearly it is not; but the unrefined, common sense 
notion underpinning it is bound to have a much higher degree of validity across 
jurisdictional boundaries). While this book is dominated by civilian contributors, it 
naturally has the ambition not to misrepresent the common-law tradition: neither 
misunderstanding its distinctive character nor – an equally common trap for 
comparatists – assuming that it is fundamentally different because this is how some 
have wished to represent it.  
To return to the subject-matter of the book, the topic of the conference was 
“the consequences of possession” but, in order to limits the scope of a very wide 
topic, the specification was immediately made that what we were interested in was the 
consequences of possession in and by itself: leaving aside the definitional problem for 
now, what this meant was to exclude any consequences which are triggered by more 
than the “sitting over” – such doctrines as prescriptive acquisition, based on the 
passing of time and often some sort of justificatory original transaction, or the 
acquisition of fruits, which supposes the coming into existence of such fruits and thus, 
again, time. Rather, the emphasis was to be on the protection of possession: given the 
mere fact of possession as the sitting over a thing (as possibly tweaked by the law’s 
later refinement of the concept), what are the legal remedies that can be sought if such 
possession is being interfered with? This is what this book primarily – albeit not 
exclusively – concerns itself with, and what the present introduction will focus on. 
While possession is one of the legal topics which have caused the most ink to 
flow within private law, especially over the last two hundred years, it is hoped that 
this volume can in fact bring new light to the debate, because it is one of the first 
                                                        
13 Below (n 39).  
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attempts – certainly, the first on this scale – to study the topic comparatively. It has 
been rightly observed that the comparative study of the law of property lags behind 
that of, for example, the law of obligations.
14
 It is not difficult to see why, but neither 
should we be content: the benefits of the comparative exercise are, whatever its 
outcome, too obvious to state. Naturally, bringing together the common law and the 
civilian tradition adds a further challenge, and this book has no other ambition than to 
bring some new bricks to the edification of our knowledge and understanding of the 
field. It will have achieved its goal if its spurs further comparative investigation in a 
way that does justice to the complexity of the law. 
The conference was to focus on the main civilian jurisdictions (France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain) – unavoidably bringing out, behind them, Roman and canon 
law; also on English law; and, as befits a Scottish enterprise, on mixed legal systems. 
Contributions were made by lawyers educated or working in England, France, 
Germany, Italy, Quebec, Scotland and South Africa: their papers make up the rest of 
this book. The aim of this introductory chapter is to help contextualise them by 
providing some background information against which their significance can be better 
appreciated.  
Four questions will be addressed more specifically, the first two concerning 
possession and its protection, while the third and fourth address, more briefly, two 
recurrent puzzles concerning the law of possession, which the book also deals with 
from a comparative perspective. These four questions are: 1) Why protect 
possession?; 2) How is possession protected?; 3) How does the fact of possession 
relate to any rights to or of possession?; 4) What is so-called “quasi-possession”? 
 
A.  WHAT IS POSSESSION AND WHY PROTECT IT? 
Protecting possession: the first question we might want to ask is, Why? It was already 
mentioned that there is nothing self-evident with the preservation of the status quo (or 
status quo ante): without more, the claim that “I am (or was) sitting over Daisy” does 
not, according to common morality, disclose a good reason for the law to intervene. A 
further complication is brought by the fact that the law does not protect every sort of 
holding: whether it restricts the use of the word “possession” to such instances as are 
protected by the law, or holds that only some types of possession give rise to redress 
                                                        
14 S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds), Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and 
International Property Law (2012) viii. 
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when they are interfered with, one needs to look at the situations where the law does 
indeed seek to provide a remedy to understand why it might want to do so. The 
question, “Why protect possession?” is thus inextricably intertwined with that other 
question, “What is (legally protected) possession?” 
This is a bold question to ask. As even the non-specialist will know, thousands 
of pages have been written on the topic, in Germany alone, in the sole context of 
Roman law. Providing a nuanced answer in a historical and comparative perspective 
would be a colossal task, far beyond the ambitions of this introductory chapter. Nor 
can the answer be, tempting though it may be, to take as a starting point the “official” 
definition that some legal systems have cared to provide, for instance that of the 
French Civil Code:
15
 this would unwarrantedly tilt the debate towards a particular 
jurisdiction. Indeed, assuming that words have, across jurisdictional and temporal 
divides, the meaning that one was first exposed to is one of the most redoubtable 
mistakes that comparatists can make, more often than not in perfectly good faith.  
What we should attempt to do, instead, is stand back and try to identify, in the 
great mass of historical data centring on the (pre-legal) idea of controlling a thing, the 
common core or cores of the legal doctrines which seek to address this factual 
situation. Perhaps paradoxically, asking the question at such a high level of generality, 
across the divide between the civilian and common-law traditions, and without 
reference to any particular jurisdiction or point in time, makes it in fact much easier to 
identify some key ideas that will serve, at least provisionally, as a guide through the 
thicket. This is what this section endeavours to do.  
  
(1) Three levels of possession 
Despite the obvious danger of oversimplication, it seems fair to say that, historically, 
we can identify three different types of possession in the eyes of the law.
16
 This 
                                                        
15 Art 2255 (formerly 2228) French Civil Code: “La possession est la détention ou la jouissance d'une 
chose ou d'un droit que nous tenons ou que nous exerçons par nous-mêmes, ou par un autre qui la tient 
ou qui l’exerce en notre nom” [Possession is the holding or enjoyment of a thing or a right which we 
hold or exercise by ourselves, or through another who holds or exercises it in our name] (my 
translation). 
16 This survey is limited to cases of what is generally referred to as direct possession (in German 
scholarship, where the distinction was first articulated, unmittelbarer Besitz, “immediate possession”), 
contrasted with indirect (mittelbarer, “mediate”). The omission is deliberate: possession properly 
speaking is immediate – i.e. personal – possession. The doctrine of mediate possession is a construct 
which allows the law to explain how a person can be deemed to have possession even though he is not 
sitting over a thing, by considering that others are sitting over it on his behalf. It really is concerned 
with issues of representation and attribution although, to complicate the matter further, these issues are 
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picture can be reconciled with all the legal systems in contemplation, even though 
they might not all either distinguish between the three or, if they do, attach different 
legal consequences to them. (Because the received terminology is unstable, it is 
proposed to adopt a different one for the purpose of this brief survey.) 
At the top lies possession in the manner of an owner – “owner” being 
understood in the above sense of he who can claim “the thing is mine!” By this is 
meant that the “sitter” over the thing behaves in relation to it as if it were his and he 
enjoyed the ordinary prerogatives of the owner. To put it differently, he does not 
acknowledge any rival claim from someone else who might turn up and assert that 
Daisy is actually his. This might be because he really is the owner; because he 
mistakenly believes himself so to be (for example he bought the thing from someone 
who represented himself as the owner but was not); or because he has decided to 
disregard the claims of any rightful owner (the typical example of this being the 
thief). 
Next is possession in the manner of a holder who knows himself not be the 
owner and does not seek to challenge the prerogatives of the latter. Obvious examples 
will be the tenant of land or the borrower of a movable thing: both obviously control 
the thing, but they also recognise their possession to be somehow derivative – 
whatever exactly this might mean – and, in some sense at least, of inferior quality 
compared to the first scenario. Typically, although complications are possible, they 
will be in control of the thing as a result of an agreement with the owner and possess 
in good faith. Whilst it is not obvious that the law should treat this scenario differently 
from the first, it is easy to see why it might want to, and thus why we need to keep 
both categories analytically distinct.  
Finally, there is the possession-sitting of the person who holds the thing for a 
brief period of time and typically exercises his momentary control in a way that 
makes it plain to the world that he does not stand in a special relationship with the 
thing, apart from his transient holding. Though the line is evidently difficult to draw 
between this category and the previous one, core and intuitive cases include the 
                                                                                                                                                              
often not distinguished analytically from the separate issue of retention of (direct) possession after 
control has been lost: while the result might be the same in practice (e.g. a landlord will be regarded as 
having possession of the house he has let out), the legal issues are quite distinct depending on the 
chosen approach. For the same reason, possession by juristic persons will be ignored. While this is a 
vastly important topic in practice, the way the law gets around the obvious difficulty that a legal person 
has no limbs to “sit over” a thing involves doctrine of representation and attribution which, again, are 
part of the law of persons, not property and thus need not be pursued here.  
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examples, often given, of a guest holding a knife at a dinner party or a valet carrying a 
suitcase. 
Terminology. This lowest degree of holding will not normally be called 
“possession” at all, but rather “custody” or “detention”.17 Although, etymologically, 
the content of these three notions is essentially identical, the latter two tend to be 
pressed into service to designate a form of control that is regarded as less strong that 
than first one. For the present purpose, we might want to refer to this lowest tier as 
level-three possession. 
The top degree will be called either “possession” simpliciter, if it is the only 
type that is protected at law, or something else, like “civil possession”. However, the 
label “civil” applied to possession is plagued with instability and is probably best 
avoided, especially in a comparative perspective;
18
 at the very least it should not be 
used without specifying what is meant by it. We can call this type of holding “owner-
like possession” or level-one possession. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the middle tier turns out to be the most troublesome. 
Sometimes called “natural (or corporeal) possession”19 – again, both labels should be 
avoided unless clearly defined – sometimes also “detention” like the lowest level: we 
shall refer to it as “holder-like”, or level-two, possession.  
The difficulty with this category lies in the twofold tension that underpins it. 
First, it is easy to find good intuitive reasons both to protect and not to protect level-
two possession. In fact, the way legal systems choose to deal with the holder-like 
possessor is the best indicator of what underlying theory of possession they adhere to, 
and thus why they may or may not want to protect it. Secondly, if they choose not to 
protect it at law, they might either declare that level-two possession is no possession 
at all or that, even though it is, it is possession in such circumstances that the law will 
not intervene if it is interfered with. Much of the terminological confusion in the field 
of possession is caused by the fact that both strategies, despite being incompatible, are 
often pursed concurrently by the law.  
                                                        
17 From, respectively, Lat. custodia = guarding, keeping and tenere = to hold (cf Inhabung in German). 
No label existed in classical Roman law (see Schulz, Classical Roman Law (n 1) 431). 
18 Again, the term is not classical (Schulz, Classical Roman Law (n 1) 432).  
19 E.g. Ulpian describing the possession of the usufructuary: “naturaliter videtur possidere”, translated 
by Watson as “regarded as possessing in fact” (D 41.2.12. pr. = Ulpian, 70 ad Edictum).  
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Against this background, brief (and by necessity insufficiently fine-tuned) 
summaries can be offered, de lege lata, of possession and its protection in Roman 
law, the later civilian tradition and finally English law.  
 
(2)  Possession in Roman Law 
Terminologically, classical Roman law chose to reserve the term “possession” 
(possessio) to those factual situations that gave rise to possessory remedies, as 
described in the next section. The alternative was simple: either holding amounted to 
possessio and it was protected, or it did not and the “sitter” would have no remedy if 
his control came to be challenged. In post-classical law, this neat dichotomy was 
marred, in particular through the introduction of the unstable labels of “civil 
possession” (possessio civilis) and “natural possession” (possessio naturalis).20  
In terms of the substance of the law, subject to two main caveats, Roman law 
only protected level-one possession: he who controlled as owner was protected, but he 
who controlled as a holder (or as a transitory detentor) was not. In particular, to 
emphasise the most striking difference with both English law and some strands of the 
modern civilian tradition, all those who possessed pursuant to a contract – e.g. lessees, 
depositees, borrowers – were not deemed to have possession, and thus did not have 
access to possessory remedies should they lose control of the thing.
21
 
The two caveats are as follows: first, although the level-one possessor would 
be protected even if he held in bad faith (e.g. a thief), he would not be protected if his 
possession was vitiated as against the party challenging his control – the vitiated 
character of the possession being established by the fact that it had been acquired vi 
(by force), clam (secretly), or precario (by grant at will). Contrary to bad faith, 
vitiation is a relative concept: the thief who had taken Daisy away from me at night 
could claim protection against someone else attempting to do the same to him; but if I 
managed to get Daisy back from him, he would not be able to challenge my regaining 
control by bringing a possessory remedy: not because she was mine in the first 
place,
22
 but because the way he had acquired her was tainted as against me.
23
 
                                                        
20 W W Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, 3rd edn by P Stein (1963) 
197. 
21 Buckland, Text-Book (n 20) 196; Schulz (n 1) 431. 
22 Below, text to n 63. 
23 Schulz, Classical Roman Law (n 1) 429.  
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No 2013/31 
Page 11 of 31 
 
The second caveat is that, in rare circumstances, a level-two possessor would 
be deemed to have possessio and thus would be able to avail himself of possessory 
remedies. The main example of this was the pledgee of a thing.
24
 
Trying to reconstruct the underlying theory of possession which would make 
sense of these solutions kept the German legal academia busy for the best part of a 
century. While there is no need to go into this debate at any length, it is useful at least 
to sketch it out, because so much contemporary scholarship continues to approach 
issues of possession through its lens.
25
 To cut a long story very short, Savigny first 
offered an interpretation along the following lines: had possession, in Roman law, the 
“sitter” who held the thing as if it were his own, in other words our level-one 
possessor. The anomalous cases, like the pledgees, he explained away as exceptions 
based on what we would call today “policy”: while they held in pursuance of a 
contract, the purpose of their holding would easily have been frustrated had they not 
been deemed to possess. This theory, relying heavily on the holder’s state of mind, 
was described as the “subjective” theory.26  
It was attacked by Jhering, who considered that possession lay in the fact of 
holding the thing coupled with an intention so to hold (on a more than transient basis): 
so, for Jhering, both levels one and two qualified as possession (though level-three did 
not). In defence of his “objective” theory, he appealed in his turn to various 
considerations of policy so at to explain why possessory protection was denied to 
most level-two holders, despite their having prima facie possession according to his 
understanding of the term.
27
 We shall return to the dispute when considering the 
grounds for protecting possession; for now, suffice it to say that D 41.2.35 is a strong 
indicator that the gist of Savigny’s thesis was correct.28 
 
(3)  Possession in the civilian tradition 
Moving on from the first to the second life of Roman law, the great difficulty with 
understanding the modern civilian tradition is that it is almost impossible to do so at a 
more than superficial level without knowing a significant amount of the history that 
                                                        
24 Schulz, Classical Roman Law (n 1) 429. 
25 A good introduction is J Gordley & U Mattei, “Protecting possession” 44 American Journal of 
Comparative Law (1996) 293 at 294ff. 
26 F K von Savigny, Das Recht des Besitzes: Eine civilistische Abhandlung (1803). 
27 R von Jhering, Der Besitzwille: Zugleich eine Kritik der herrschenden juristischen Methode (1889). 
28 Below (n 63). 
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lies behind it. That history is, in part, Roman; but the modern law was built on two 
other pillars: canon law and feudalism. Both, but feudalism particularly, brought with 
them new rules and also new concepts. Today, this threefold basis of the modern law 
is largely disguised by the fact that the language of the law was very largely (albeit 
not completely) Romanised in the run-up to modern codifications:
29
 the student of 
Roman law diving into French or German law will not feel a sense of alienation. Yet 
the substance of the law is markedly different, even though the recasting of the law in 
Roman terms had a knock-on effect on its substance, which tended to be reinterpreted 
as if it were Roman law. In spite of this, differences are still clear, albeit not 
uniformly across jurisdictions.  
The details of the story belong elsewhere. Gordley and Mattei have provided a 
good introductory overview in the case of the two main continental systems, France 
and Germany.
30
 More will be said about these systems when considering the 
mechanisms protecting possession in the next section; the main point to highlight here 
is that the modern civilian tradition is split between two broad understandings of the 
notion of possession. The great divide is between those systems which restrict 
possession to level-one holders and those for which level-two holders also have 
possession. Germany is the main example of the latter class, probably due to the 
widespread impact of the canon-law actio spolii which, as will be seen, did not 
require the claimant to hold like an owner. This position was encapsulated in the 
Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht of 1794 and has remained the position of the law to 
the present day.
31
 Thus, in German law, possession is defined in a very broad sense as 
the effective control of a thing.
32
 
The other leading civilian jurisdiction, France, underwent an interesting 
movement of to-ing and fro-ing between the two approaches. While the Civil Code 
defines possession in such a way as to exclude only “precarious holders” (level-three 
possessors), thereby including (if implicitly) both levels one and two, its interpretation 
was firmly subjectivised in the first half of the nineteenth century, under the influence 
of Savigny.
33
 As a result, courts restricted the availability of possessory remedies to 
                                                        
29 Van Erp & Akkermans, Cases (n 14) 54. 
30 Gordley & Mattei (n 256) at 305ff. 
31 Caterina, this volume, xxx.  
32 § 854 (1) BGB: “Der Besitz einer Sache wird durch die Erlangung der tatsächlichen Gewalt über 
die Sache erworben” [Possession of a thing is acquired by obtaining effective control over it]; cf J Baur 
& R Stürner, Sachenrecht, 18th edn (2009) s 7.1.  
33 F Zénati-Castaing & T Revet, Les biens, 3rd edn (2008) s 448. 
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level-1 possessors. However, the pendulum has been swinging back ever since, and 
remedies were gradually expanded to cover level-two holders as well.
34
 Whether this 
means that the definition of possession has changed, or simply that remedies are now 
open to non-possessors as if they were possessors, has no settled answer, being 
irrelevant in practice.  
 France’s daughter jurisdiction, Quebec, was first codified at a time when the 
French understanding of possession was heavily Savignian: not having followed 
France in its more recent developments, it has remained a good illustration of the first 
paradigm.
35
 Austria is another example of the same.
36
 Thus, the civilian tradition is 
profoundly divided between these two incompatible interpretations of the concept of 
possession, one rooted through Savigny in the Roman law library; the other through 
Jhering in canon law. Indeed, in a jurisdiction like Scotland, the debate has yet to be 
settled, both views enjoying a level of support in the institutional writers and modern 
academia.
37
 
 
(4)  Possession in English law 
English law too emerged at the crossroads of medieval sources and Roman law. In 
that sense it is very much part of the wider European tradition and care must be taken 
not to drive too sharp a wedge between it and the civilian tradition that prevails over 
Continental Europe (and in Scotland). Having said this, however, it must be 
immediately emphasised that the mix is a very different one. The influence of Roman 
law was, in England, mostly formal: despite some similarities between the two 
traditions, which might be entirely coincidental, the substance of what we might 
broadly describe as the English “law of property” (a label that many common lawyers 
would hardly want to appropriate for themselves) is distinctively un-Roman.  
Though this is a complex question, what can safely be said is that the 
language of English property has been significantly Romanised; fascinatingly, 
however, the extent to which it has is not stable. To put it differently, there are a 
number of plausible ways of packaging the outcomes of English law, and these will 
rely more or less heavily on Romanist language: the form of the law is, to some 
                                                        
34 Below, xxx; Emerich, this volume, xxx. 
35 Emerich, this volume, xxx, who is critical of this position. 
36 § 309 ABGB; cf Van Erp & Akkermans (n 14) 106. 
37 D L Carey Miller, Corporeal Movables in Scots Law, 2nd edn (2005) 18ff; K G C Reid, The Law of 
Property in Scotland (1996) ss114ff; cf R Caterina, “Concepts and remedies in the law of possession” 
(2004) 8 Edinburgh Law Review 267 at 267. 
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extent, up for grabs. One interesting illustration of this indetermination is the use of 
the civilian concept of “ownership”, where approaches will range from asserting that 
it is the only proprietary right (right in rem) that exists to denying its existence 
altogether.
38
 By and large, the more the jurist expounding the law is drawn towards 
systematisation, the heavier reliance on Roman learning will be.  
Although the use of the word of possession in English law is older,
39
 the 
process of Romanisation of the concept was largely carried out – as part of a wider 
effort to rationalise the common law in the course of the nineteenth century – by 
Pollock and Wright’s 1888 book, Possession in the Common Law.40 In particular, for 
better or for worse, the book introduced the language of corpus and animus – to 
which we shall return shortly – into the common law. Despite the very significant 
differences in the way possession is protected by the law, English lawyers today 
largely share the same linguistic toolbox as their civilian counterparts. 
Crucially, just as had happened on the Continent, the modern notion of 
possession came to dislodge the medieval doctrine of seisin. Seisin is a feudal concept 
which is not peculiarly English,
41
 although the earlier Romanisation of property law 
on the Continent might easily give that impression to the modern lawyer. As a legal 
construct, seisin is difficult to grasp: while Pollock and Maitland tell us that “[s]eisin 
is possession”,42 the reality is that it was a multifaceted concept that lawyers left 
undefined, and which produced different effects depending on the various actions in 
the context of which it could be called upon (e.g. novel disseisin, mort d’ancestor, 
writs of entry).
43
 If it was possession, at any rate, it would have been possession in a 
sense closer to Roman law than modern English law.
44
 
In the modern law, possession – in the sense of possession which the law takes 
cognisance of by protecting it – is essentially physical control. Like civilian systems, 
English law shrinks, albeit reluctantly, from ascribing possession to mere transient 
                                                        
38 Compare B McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law (2008) 140 with W J Swadling, “Rescission, 
property and the common law” (2005) 12 LQR 123 at 133. 
39 The count in the action of trover or conversion, which as will be seen was one of the main vehicles to 
protect possession in English law, required the claimant to allege that he had been “possessed” of the 
disputed res (Hickey, this volume, xxx). 
40 R Hickey, Property and the Law of Finders (2010) 97. 
41 The same doctrine was known as Gewere in Germanic territories and saisine in France.  
42 F Pollock & F W Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, 2nd edn, vol 2 
(1968) 29. 
43 W W Buckland & A McNair, Roman Law and Common Law, 2nd edn, ed by F H Lawson (1965) 66-
67; F W Maitland, “The mystery of seisin”, in H A L  Fisher (ed), The Collected Papers of Frederic 
William Maitland, vol 1 (1911) 358. 
44 Buckland & McNair, Roman Law (n 43) 73. 
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detentors like servants
45
 (in our terminology, level-three possessors); but it treats as 
possessors both level-one and level-two possessors, i.e. those who “sit upon” the thing 
as owners and also as mere holders.
46
 Not only will the protection be the same; 
English law would not want to draw a distinction between the two classes in the first 
place. Thus, contrary to Roman law (but similarly, as was seen, to modern German 
law), English law treats the lessee, the borrower and the depositee as possessors 
protected through the ordinary remedies of the law. But, as in Roman law, a degree of 
artificiality is brought about by the recognition that one can be deemed a possessor at 
law while not, or no longer, having actual control of the thing he is supposed to “sit” 
upon.
47
  
 As Buckland and McNair have pointed out, this wider protection of holders 
gives away the fact that English law adheres to a very different understanding of 
possession when compared to Roman law. (However, for the reasons mentioned 
above, this is not what sets out the common law from the modern civilian tradition.) 
Behind what appears to be technical and partly arbitrary decisions as to which classes 
of holders are or are not regarded as having possession, two completely different 
pictures emerge. English possession, despite some discrepancies, is essentially 
control: it has remained very close to the layman’s understanding, as borne out by 
etymology, of sitting over the thing. Roman law, on the other hand, despite Ulpian’s 
statement – as famous as it is misleading – that “ownership has nothing in common 
with possession”, 48  mostly conceived of possession in relation with ownership. 
Though, there too, there were discrepancies, the Roman possessor was typically the 
person who could be the owner and would likely become owner if he was not 
already.
49
  
 
(5)  The grounds of protection 
In turn, this dual perspective has consequences on the underlying reasons for 
protecting possession. If protected possession is owner-like control, inevitably the 
protection of possession will be an indirect way of protecting ownership, which on 
that reading is what truly matters. The claimant’s possession will be protected by the 
                                                        
45 Buckland & McNair, Roman Law (n 43) 70-1; D Sheehan, The Principles of Personal Property Law 
(2011) 9. The ancient rule was different: Pollock & Wright, Essay (n 12) 9. 
46 Buckland & McNair, Roman Law (n 43) 71; Sheehan, Principles (n 45) 9. 
47 Buckland & McNair, Roman Law (n 43) 75.  
48 “Nihil commune habet proprietas cum possessione”: D 41.2.12.1 (Ulpian, 70 ad Edictum). 
49 Buckland & McNair, Roman Law (n 43) 73-4; cf D 41.2.35, below (n 63). 
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law because the possessor is either the owner (at least the likely owner) or, if he is 
not, a possessor probably on his way to becoming the owner. Possession in bad faith 
naturally muddles the picture, for it is difficult to see why someone who clearly is not, 
and most likely will never become, the owner should nonetheless be protected; but in 
practice the problem will be bypassed by insisting that the claimant should come to 
the law with clean hands: if his possession is, to use the term typically employed, 
“vitiated” (e.g. by the use of force or stealth), he will not be able to avail himself of 
the law’s protection. The few remaining cases where the bad-faith possessor is 
nonetheless protected (for instance, the thief against another thief) will be explained 
away as instances of overshooting.  
This, namely that possession is protected as the “outwork of ownership”, was 
the position of Jhering,
50
 and is still dominant today in particular in French legal 
scholarship.
51
 Why then, it might be asked, protect ownership indirectly, through 
possession, rather than directly as ownership? The short answer is, because it is much 
easier to prove possession than ownership (so much so that even systems which claim 
to draw a clear line between the two concepts are unlikely to require more to succeed 
in an action for the protection of ownership than proof of a better possession, whether 
present or past, than the defendant’s).52 
On the other hand, if the protection of the law is extended to all those who 
hold the thing, only excluding those who are said to detain it in a transient way, then it 
becomes clear that possession has to be valued for its own sake. Why would it be? 
This is not obvious. It is clear, according to common morality, that the claim “Daisy 
is mine” carries with it, at least failing some very strong countervailing factors, the 
accessory claim “and therefore I should have her back” when someone stands 
between me and her. On the other hand, in itself, the claim “I sit upon Daisy” (but 
John is trying to wrestle her away from me) or “I sat upon Daisy” (but John has 
succeeded in wrestling her away) does not display any such remedial force. After all, 
I might be a thief and John might be the owner. Or it might be that we both spotted a 
wild cow in the hills; I took her first but John thinks he is equally entitled to 
appropriate her for himself. If we want to identify a reason for the law to intervene, 
we need either to add particular attributes to my possession, explaining why it should 
                                                        
50 Buckland, Text-Book (n 20) 199 and references cited.  
51 Emerich, this volume, xxx. 
52 Buckland & McNair, Roman Law (n 43) 76ff. 
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be protected (at least in relation to John), or else accept as a basic principle that it is 
wrong to disturb settled instances of factual control without due legal process. By 
doing this, we move to something close to the restraint of self-help and the protection 
of public peace as the ground for protection possession: this, as is well known, was 
Savigny’s position.53  
 
(6)  Corpus and animus  
We return to the definition of possession. The reader might be surprised not to have 
encountered so far, but for one allusion, the two Latin terms that are most commonly 
associated with the notion – not only in the civilian world but also in the common-law 
tradition – namely, corpus and animus. The omission was deliberate, these terms 
posing more problems than they solve. It is however impossible not to mention them 
at all or try to relate them to the above developments.  
Both Romanist systems and English law agree that possession consists in (or, 
more precisely, is acquired through) these two elements, although neither tradition has 
defined them.
54
 Corpus (literally, “body”) is uncontroversially a form of physical 
control. What counts as physical control can be tricky to determine in practice, but the 
basic idea is clear enough. Animus (“mind”, “soul”) is more troublesome. Clearly it is 
a form of intention towards the thing on the part of the person who holds it; but the 
basic ambiguity that has marred the development of the law is whether it is an 
intention to control the thing as the owner (level-one possession: animus domini
55
 or 
animus rem sibi habendi),
56
 or an intention to control the thing as a holder (level-2 
possession: animus tenendi or possidendi)
57
. Each time the term is used without its 
being made clear which is meant, which has been and remains extremely common, 
the ambiguity is perpetuated: for this reason, it would do no harm if lawyers stopped 
using the language of corpus and animus altogether. 
                                                        
53 Buckland, Text-Book (n 20) 199 and references cited; Halpérin, Histoire (n 1) 39; J Gordley, 
Foundations of Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment (2006) 53ff.; Zénati-
Castaing & Revet, Biens (n 334) s 443; Emerich, this volume, xxx. An interesting question is why the 
protection of possession would not, on that assumption, be left to the criminal law. 
54 Buckland & McNair, Roman Law (n 43) 70. 
55 From dominus = master. 
56 Literally, the “mind [of] having the thing to oneself”. Neither expression is Roman: both were coined 
by Savigny. 
57 The “mind to hold” or “to possess”. Animus possidendi appears e.g. in D 41.3.4.2 (Paul, 54 ad 
Edictum) and affectio tenendi in D 41.2.1.3 (idem). 
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Indeed, it is not difficult to see how this basic twofold understanding of 
possession as comprising an element of factual control and an element of intention, 
whatever the latter might consist in, is going to run into difficulties very quickly. A 
favourite example of law teachers is a situation like my car parked back home. Do I 
have possession of it, even though I am miles away? Most people would want to say 
that, failing some special circumstances (like a thief breaking in and driving it away), 
I do. But if so, is it because I still have corpus (after all, the car is locked and I have 
the key in my pocket) or because, even though I no longer have control, I have 
somehow retained my possession solely by the power of the will (“animo solo”, to use 
the received terminology)? The second option has generally been favoured,
58
 even 
though it leads to puzzling results: for, if possession requires an element of control 
and an element of intention (corpore et animo),
59
 then elementary logic dictates that it 
ought to cease to exist when either of the elements disappears (aut corpore aut 
animo).
60
 At any rate, the fact that both interpretations are often allowed to coexist is 
a principal cause of conceptual instability. 
 
B.  THE MECHANISMS OF PROTECTION 
Focusing, from now on, on such possession as is protected by law (in the sense that 
the legal system is willing to intervene should it be interfered with by another), we 
now turn to the hows of its protection. The purpose of this section is to provide a brief 
overview of the mechanisms whereby possession is or was protected in Roman law, 
the later civilian tradition and English law. Again, the details do not belong in what is 
meant to be a general overview. 
 
(1)  Roman law 
In classical Roman law, the mechanisms that were used to protect possession 
considered in and by itself were the possessory interdicts.
61
 The praetor intervened to 
protect possession in clusters of situations covered by three different interdicts (or 
                                                        
58 e.g. Schulz, Classical Roman Law  (n 1) 442. 
59 D 41.2.3.1 (Paul, 54 ad Edictum): ‘Now we take possession physically and mentally, not mentally 
alone or physically alone’ (tr Watson Digest). 
60 Yet the principle laid down by Paul is the exact opposite: D 41.2.8 (Paul, 65 ad Edictum): “Just as no 
possession can be acquired except physically and with intent, so none is lost unless both elements are 
departed from” (tr Watson Digest).  
61 The term interdicta possessoria was however unknown to classical jurists (Schulz, Classical Roman 
Law (n 1) 444). For the exclusion of protection granted to possession plus an extra element (like time), 
see above, xxx. On the notion of an interdict, see e.g. Schulz (n 1) 59ff. 
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four, depending on how they are counted).
62
 One remarkable point they had in 
common is that, in all cases, the dispute was entirely independent from any question 
of ownership (or right to possess). Not only were, to use the traditional terminology, 
“possessory” remedies entirely distinct from “petitory” ones; contrary to English law, 
it never was a defence to a possessory interdict to offer to prove that one was the 
rightful owner of the thing over which control was disputed: if he wanted to regain 
factual control of the thing, the owner had to bring an entirely different action, the rei 
vindicatio (which carried with it the – much higher – burden of proving ownership).63 
On the other hand, as mentioned, the person who was seeking to have his possession 
recognised and protected was not to have obtained it in such a way (vi clam precario) 
that it would be vitiated as against the other party.
64
  
Two interdicts, unde vi and uti possidetis, concerned immovables (≈ land) and 
one, utrubi, movables (≈ chattels). Edicts could have a prohibitory or recuperative 
function, or both, depending on whether they were intended to preserve the status quo 
when possession was being threatened, or return to the status quo ante when the 
former holder had had the thing taken away from him.
65
 
 
(a) Interdictum unde vi 
 
The interdict “from which, by violence” (unde vi) came in two forms: one when the 
violence used was armed and the other when it was not.
66
 
 
(i) Interdictum de vi armata 
 
The “interdict concerning [the use of] armed force” was available to the possessor of 
land against the person who had dispossessed him with the help of armed men. The 
formula of the interdict ran as follows: 
 
                                                        
62 H F Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (1965) 275ff. 
63 D 41.2.35 (Ulpian, 5 All Seats of Judgment): “The outcome of a dispute over possession is simply 
this: that the judge makes an interim finding that one of the parties possesses; the result will be that the 
party defeated on the issue of possession will take on the role of plaintiff when the question of 
ownership is contested” (tr Watson Digest). This gives away the fact that possession was, for the 
Romans, essentially regarded as a claim to being the owner (level-one possession, above, xxx, cf n 49). 
64 Schulz, Classical Roman Law (n 1) 448. 
65 J 4.15.1. 
66 J 4.15.6. 
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Unde tu illum vi hominibus coactis armatisve 
deiecisti aut familia tua deiecit, eo illum 
quaeque ille tunc ibi habuit restituas. 
Bring the plaintiff back to the place from 
which you have expelled him by armed force 
and restore also the things which the plaintiff 
had in that place.
67
 
 
The Romans resolved pragmatically what could have otherwise become analytically 
insoluble questions about possession and former possession: in the basic scenario, a 
former possessor who no longer holds is allowed to claim a possessory remedy 
against the new holder who is possessor in the strongest sense of the term (level one), 
because the latter’s possession is regarded as vitiated by the use of force. As was 
noted, assertion of ownership was no defence to the defendant; what did constitute a 
defence (exceptio), however, was if the claimant had himself dispossessed the 
defendant by use of armed force at an earlier stage. 
 
(b) Interdictum de vi non armata 
 
Like the previous one, the “interdict concerning non-armed force” was available to 
the (former) possessor of land against the person who had dispossessed him through 
the use of force, this time unarmed. Its formula ran as follows: 
 
Unde in hoc anno tu illum vi deiecisti aut 
familia tua deiecit, cum ille possideret, quod 
nec vi nec clam nec precario a te possideret, 
eo illum quaeque ille tunc ibi habuit 
restituas. 
 
Bring the plaintiff back to the place from 
which in the course of this year you have 
expelled him, and restore also the things 
which the plaintiff had in this place, provided 
that the plaintiff had not obtained possession 
from you vi, clam, or precario.
68
 
 
One will notice here the standard defence of vitiated possession (exceptio vitiosae 
possessionis), already mentioned. 
 
 
                                                        
67 Schulz, Classical Roman Law (n 1) 446 (his translation); cf O Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum, 3rd 
edn (1927) s 245.2. One will note that no technical term such as “possession” appears; only a layman 
notion of “having” the thing. 
68 Schulz, Classical Roman Law (n 1) 447-448 (idem); cf Lenel (n 67) s 245.1. 
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(c) Interdictum uti possidetis 
 
This interdict, “as you possess”, was probably the most ancient: like the previous ones 
it concerned immovables only; but its function was prohibitive rather than 
recuperative. Its formula ran as follows: 
 
Uti nunc eas aedes, quibus de agitur, nec vi 
nec clam nec precario alter ab altero 
possidetis, quo minus ita possideatis, vim 
fieri veto. 
I forbid force to be used to prevent him of 
you two who is at present in a faultless 
possession of the disputed building from 
possessing it as he at present does.
69
 
 
What it did was thus to forbid the use of force (vim fieri veto) pending any 
determination of the better right to possess. As a result, the current possessor would 
be defendant in any ensuing petitory suit (the rei vindicatio), which of course was a 
considerable advantage. 
 
(d) Interdictum utrubi  
 
The interdict utrubi (from utrubi… utrubi = “on the one hand…on the other”) 
concerned movables and had both a prohibitive and a recuperatory function. An 
example of the formula, in the case of a slave, would run as follows: 
 
Utrubi hic homo, quo de agitur, maiore parte 
huiusce anni nec vi nec clam nec precario ab 
altero fuit, quo minus is eum ducat, vim fieri 
veto. 
He of you who for the greater part of the 
preceding year possessed the slave faultlessly 
may take him and I forbid force to prevent 
him from doing so.
70
 
 
The dispute between the current and the former holder of the thing would be 
adjudicated on the basis of who had held it longest over the year prior to the 
intervention of the praetor. It is he who would retain or regain possession of the thing 
and thus be defendant in the petitory action that would likely ensue. 
 
                                                        
69 Schulz, Classical Roman Law (n 1) 448 (idem); cf J 4.15.4 and D 43.17.1 pr. (Ulpian, 69 ad 
Edictum). 
70 Schulz, Classical Roman Law (n 1) 451 (idem); cf J 4.15.4. 
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Post-classical Law. By the time of Justinian, the above picture had been simplified. 
The two interdicta unde vi had been merged into one and the interdictum utrubi was 
done away with, protection of movables being provided in its stead through the 
extension to chattels of the interdictum uti possidetis. Thus, only two interdicts – 
technically they had became actions – remained: the interdicta unde vi and uti 
possidetis.
71
 However, the latter was emptied of its recuperative function, leaving a 
gap in the law for the restoration of movables. In time, this came to be filled by the 
actio spolii of the canon law.
72
 
 
(2)  The Civilian tradition 
As was mentioned, the modern civilian notion of possession emerged at the 
crossroads of three sources: Roman law, canon law and feudal law. It is not surprising 
therefore that the mechanisms developed by the law to protect possession, being 
essentially the reverse side of the understanding it has of the doctrine, should also be 
rooted in them. The following brief developments focus, as before, on France and 
Germany.
73
 
The main canon-law development was, as alluded to, the emergence of the 
actio spolii (“action for stripping”), which proved extremely influential in the later 
history of possession, especially in Germanic territories. The actio emerged from an 
earlier defence, the exceptio spolii mentioned in the canon Redintegranda of the 
Pseudo-Isidore, according to which a bishop whom secular authorities had deprived 
of his property or his bishopric was protected from any criminal prosecution until 
these had been returned to him. Under the general exceptio spolii, as transplanted into 
the civil law, any possessor in the level-one or level-two sense who was ousted from 
his land or chattels without his consent could reject all action brought by the 
dispossessor until he had been restored to his former position. The exceptio was later 
turned into an action, the actio spolii, which allowed possession to be regained as 
                                                        
71
 Schulz, Classical Roman Law (n 1) 453. 
72 Schulz, Classical Roman Law (n 1) 453. On the actio spolii, see immediately below. 
73 For Italy, see Caterina, this volume, xxx; for the action of spuilzie and the possessory judgment in 
Scots law, see Anderson, this volume, xxx; for the mandament van spolie in South African law, see 
Kleyn, this volume, esp. xxx. 
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against not only the spoliator but also third parties who had acquired possession in the 
knowledge of the earlier spoliation.
74
  
When it comes to immovables, dispossessed plaintiffs in what would become 
Germany could use this actio spolii, which came to dislodge the more restrictive 
Roman action unde vi.
75
 In France, they had at their disposal both the action en 
réintégrande (“action for reintegration”), derived from the actio spolii, and the 
complainte en cas de saisine et nouvelleté (“complain in case of seisin and novelty”), 
an action rooted in feudal law.
76
 As to movables, customary actions (rather than 
Roman interdicts) were used in both countries.
77
 These actions had all been developed 
around the concept of Gewere or saisine (seisin), which later learned law came to 
reinterpret as possession: though boundaries can be difficult to identify with precision 
because the same word, “possession”, can have different (and often unspecified) 
shades of meaning, it is certainly true to say that, by and large, these remedies reached 
beyond those who would have been able to avail themselves of possessory interdicts 
in Roman law (i.e. essentially level-one possessors) to include at least some level-two 
possessors. 
For threatened possession of movables, early modern German law had 
retained the Roman action uti possidetis but, when possession had already been lost, 
recourse had to be made to a customary action.
78
 In France, through an interesting 
twist of history, the possession of movables came to be protected mainly through the 
use of the rei vindicatio (the purpose of which was to assert ownership),
79
 most likely 
because the possessor who had acquired control of the thing in good faith was 
assumed to be the owner – a principle which crystallised in the modern presumption 
that “possession counts as title”.80 The extent to which possessory actions can be used 
alongside the action en revendication in the case of movables was and still is 
disputed.
81
 
                                                        
74 M Kaser, Roman Private Law, tr Rolf Dannenbring, 2nd edn (1968) 92; Caterina, this volume, xxx; 
Gordley & Mattei (n 256) at 307. 
75 Gordley & Mattei (n 26) at 307. 
76 For the modern law, see Zénati-Castaing & Revet, Biens (n 334) s 488. There is a third, less 
important action: the action en dénonciation de nouvelle œuvre.  
77 Gordley & Mattei (n 25) at 306. 
78 Gordley & Mattei (n 256) at 306-307. 
79 Gordley & Mattei (n 256) at 312. 
80 Art 2276 (formerly 2279) French Civil Code: “en fait de meubles, la possession vaut titre”. 
81 Zénati-Castaing & Revet, Biens (n 334) ss 500, 503; F Zénati-Castaing, note in [1996] Revue 
trimestrielle de droit civil 934 ff. 
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Of particular interest in a French context is the relationship between the two 
land-focused actions of réintégrande and complainte, which were codified under 
Louis XIV in the Ordonnance civile of 1667.
82
 Réintégrande could be brought by 
anyone who had been dispossessed by violence, irrespective of how long he had been 
in possession. Complainte, on the other hand, could only be relied upon by a plaintiff 
who had been in uninterrupted possession for a year and a day (but without a 
requirement of violent dispossession). It had both a prohibitory and a recuperative 
function: it could be brought either by someone who had already lost control, or one 
whose holding was being threatened by the defendant. Complainte was more 
restricted than the actio spolii and, in particular, could not be brought by a lessee.
83
 
The lessee was however allowed by courts to bring the réintégrande in the nineteenth 
century,
84
 and the law was changed in 1975 to allow him to bring the complainte 
against third-party dispossessors.
85
 
As can be seen, while their conditions were distinct, the two actions 
overlapped to a significant extent and also left some gaps. This is not surprising given 
that they had originated in two distinct bodies of law to fulfil much the same role; yet 
it called for rationalisation. This was mainly carried out in the nineteenth century 
through a process of Romanisation of what were two un-Roman actions. Taking 
advantage of the lack of clear boundaries, post-codification commentators, who knew 
their Roman law but were increasingly out of touch with pre-Civil Code customs, 
reinterpreted complainte as an action to maintain possession (like uti possidetis) and 
réintégrande as an action to recover it (like unde vi).
86
 In this, they were following, 
but only in part, the lead of Pothier, who had already tried to rationalise the actions, 
but along different lines (merging both actions in one, the single complainte, which he 
divided into complainte en cas de saisine ou nouvelleté, for violent dispossession, and 
action de réintégrande, for simple disturbance).
87
 
In codified German law, possessory remedies are now regulated by §§ 861-
867 and 1007 BGB. The dispossessed plaintiff can sue for the recovery of the thing he 
                                                        
82 Gordley & Mattei (n 256) at 313; Caterina, this volume, xxx. 
83 Gordley & Mattei (n 26) at 313. 
84 Cass. 25 March 1857, Dalloz 1858.1.315; Gordley & Mattei (n 256) at 313. 
85 Law of 9 July 1975; Gordley & Mattei (n 256) at 313. The current law pertaining to possessory 
remedies can be found in arts 2278-9 Code civil and Art 1264-7 Nouveau code de procédure civile. 
86 Gordley & Mattei (n 256) at 317. 
87 Caterina, this volume, xxx and references cited. 
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previously possessed; and the claimant whose possession is being threatened can 
obtain an injunction. As in Roman law, no exceptio domini is allowed (rather, the 
owner must bring a rei vindicatio pursuant to § 985 BGB); but the dominus can raise 
a defence based on the vitiated character of the claimant’s (earlier) possession as 
against him.
88
  
 
(3) English law 
It is often said that the notion of possession in English law is fundamentally different 
from what it was and is in the Romanist tradition. It is hoped that the above will have 
shown how incorrect this is. English law, like the civilian tradition, Romanised to a 
large extent the medieval (and pan-European) notion of seisin; and made the broad 
choice to protect level-two as well as level-one possession – a choice that was also 
made in many but (as was seen) not all continental jurisdictions. When it comes to the 
modern understanding of possession, English law is closer to German law than, for 
example, French law would be. 
The real divide lies, if anywhere, in the consequences attached to possession 
(though here too the statement will have to be nuanced). First, according to English 
orthodoxy, possession immediately creates ownership. This proposition, entirely 
baffling for the civilian lawyer,
89
 can only be understood against the background of 
the doctrine of relative ownership (or, to use a more common word, “title”), according 
to which anyone who holds a thing in such a way as to qualify as its possessor 
becomes ipso facto its owner: not the owner, but an owner of the thing.
90
 Title, in 
turn, is understood as a right to possess,
91
 which can vest in a variety of persons. As a 
result, in a dispute over possession-ownership-title, will prevail the party who can 
show the better title, i.e. the better right to possess (which typically will derive from 
evidence of earlier possession). Consonant with the principle of relative title, A might 
prevail over B as having a better entitlement to possess a given thing, only to be 
                                                        
88 Van Erp & Akkermans, Cases (n 14) 120; Baur & Stürner (n 31) ss 9.16ff.  
89 However, the English collapse of the two notions has a number of echoes in the Romanist tradition, 
e.g. the principle of occupatio (acquisition of the ownership of an ownerless thing by grabbing it) or 
the presumption that the possessor of a movable is its owner which avails under French law (above, n 
80) or German law (§ 1006 BGB). 
90 Pollock & Wright, Essay (n 12) 22; Hickey, Property (n 40) 162ff.; S Douglas, Liability for 
Wrongful Interferences with Chattels (2011) 24ff., McFarlane (n 38) 144ff. 
91 Sheehan, Principles (n 45) 13. 
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defeated later by C who can prove an ever better title.
92
 This is fundamentally at odds 
with the rhetoric of Roman law and systems rooted in it, even though it has been 
rightly remarked that the distance might be much smaller when it comes to the actual 
operation of the law.
93
 
In terms of the protection of possession (qua title), English law draws a clear 
distinction between movables and immovables – in English terminology, though the 
approximation is imperfect, chattels and land. As far as the former are concerned, a 
fundamental difference with the civilian tradition is that English law always protects 
possession-title (as indeed all property rights) indirectly, i.e. through personal rather 
than real actions.
94
 The basis of the action is not the assertion of the possession-title 
but the wrong committed when the defendant interfered with it unlawfully. 
Overwhelmingly, the cause of action used will be the tort (civil wrong) of 
conversion.
95
 The successful plaintiff will recover money damages, although since 
1977 courts have had the power to make an order for the return of the thing itself.
96
  
When it comes to land, however, English law did develop an action in rem, the 
action of ejectment. The history of the action is a complex one; and it is likely that 
what was passed off in the nineteenth century as a rationalisation, moving beyond (to 
use Pollock’s phrase) “the details of the old law”,97 made in reality not insignificant 
changes to the law. Hickey has argued for this point persuasively.
98
 Be that as it may, 
it is clear that, in the modern law, and action for the recovery of land is open to the 
possessor of realty and constitutes the common law’s principal mechanism for the 
protection of possession.
99
 
 
 
 
                                                        
92 D Fox, “Relativity of title in law and at equity” (2006) CLJ 330; cf Buckland & McNair, Roman Law 
(n 43) 67. 
93 Birks (n 6) at 27ff. 
94 Douglas, Liability (n 901) 1ff.  
95 Hickey, Property (n 40) 98. For the argument that conversion performs in English law what was the 
function of the rei vindicatio in Roman law, see R Hickey, “Wrongs and the Protection of Personal 
Property” [2011] Conv 48, 49-50 
96 Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, s 3(2)(a).  
97 Pollock & Wright, Essay (n 12) 94. 
98 Hickey, Property  (n 40) 102ff. 
99 Technically the action of ejectment was abolished in 1852 (Common Law Procedure Act 1852, ss 
168-221) but the Act did not alter the substance of the law. English law will now speak of an action to 
recover land, in untechnical terms, where the old law would have spoken of ejectment.  
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C. POSSESSION AS A FACT AND POSSESSION AS A RIGHT 
One of the old chestnuts in the law of property is to ask whether possession is a “fact” 
or a “right”. While, as Buckland remarked in the context of Roman law, “the question 
whether possessio was or was not a right is somewhat empty”,100 a few remarks can 
profitably be made in the present context. 
First, of course, the two terms of the dichotomy are not mutually exclusive and 
the answer need not be either/or. Second, whether possession is a fact depends on 
what is meant by “fact”. In one sense, anything that exists in reality (even the reality 
of the mind) is a fact. On that basis, possession will of course be a fact (as will 
ownership, with which it is typically contrasted when it suggested that one is a “right” 
while the other is a mere “fact”);101 but this tells us nothing of substance about it. If 
what is meant, on the other hand, is that whether an individual has possession of a 
thing or not is a sheer question of fact – as opposed to law – then this is demonstrably 
untrue. The moment a legal system recognises that someone can be deemed to be the 
possessor of a thing which he does not actually control (for example because it has 
been taken from him), possession can no longer be said to be simply a matter of 
fact:
102
 by refining it away from the layman’s notion of “sitting upon”, the law has 
also turned the existence of a possessory relationship between person A and thing x 
into an – at least partly – legal question. 
As to whether possession is a right, this question is complicated by there being 
two very different things that might refer to. If by right, in respect of possession, is 
meant a right to possession (i.e. a right to be granted control of a thing one does not 
currently hold), then it is hard to deny that such a right can exist. Indeed, “right to 
possession” (or to “immediate possession”) is a common definition of ownership-title 
in English law;
103
 and German scholars started to speak the same language (ius 
possidendi) in the nineteenth century.
104
  
                                                        
100 Buckland, Text-Book (n 20) 203. 
101 This was indeed the language used by Roman lawyers: B Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law 
(1962) 114. 
102 Nicholas, Introduction (n 101) 115. 
103 See e.g. Honoré (n 4) at 113: “The right to possess, viz. to have exclusive physical control of a 
thing, or to have such control as the nature of the thing admits, is the foundation on which the whole 
superstructure of ownership rests. Sheehan, Principles (n 45) 5: “the right to possession is the root of 
all title to chattels at common law”. This right to possess does not have to be absolute, simply better 
than that of the party against whom it is asserted. 
104 Gordley, Foundations (n 534) 53. The expression is naturally older, although instances are scarce 
before the nineteenth century. 
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Distinct is the question whether the relationship of factual control, coupled 
with intention, is itself a right (besides being a fact). It makes no doubt that possession 
is, in Schulz’ words, “a fact … endowed with legal consequences”. 105  It is a 
relationship between a person and a thing which is, within certain parameters, 
protected by the law. Is this – a legally protected relationship – not a perfectly good 
definition of what a right is? In that sense, possession does indeed seem to be a right: 
the right of possession (ius possessionis). The difficulty that crops up immediately is 
how it can be transferred. Thus, my heir can inherit my ownership of Daisy; but can I 
bequeath to him possession of the res I controlled before death? Presumably he would 
need to grab it for himself, in which case, provided he has the right intention, he 
would become possessor anyway, whether or not I had instituted him heir of all my 
patrimony (for the same reason, it is not clear whether I could sell my possession of 
Daisy: if possession is a right, it does not appear to have any assignable value). Not 
only this, but it would seem that, the moment I die, my right of possession vanishes 
for want of the requisite elements of corpus and animus – in which case there is 
nothing left for my heir to inherit.  
The Romans were confronted with this difficulty and maintained that 
possession could pass from the deceased to his heir: “When we are instituted heirs”, 
Javolenus writes, “once we accept the inheritance, all the rights pertaining thereto 
belong to us; but possession does not become ours unless we physically take it”.106 By 
what legal mechanism this was possible, we are not told. The later civilian tradition 
developed the doctrine that le mort saisit le vif (“the dead seizes the living”), 
according to which – surprising as this might seem in the light of general principles – 
possession can pass instantly to the heir at the point of death. This makes possession 
similar to any patrimonial right. An alternative would be to consider possession not as 
a patrimonial right but as a personality right: fully a right, but not one that can be 
detached from the person who holds it. This was Aubry and Rau’s position,107 but it 
has not met with much success. 
 
 
 
                                                        
105 Schulz, Classical Roman Law (n 1) 428. 
106 D 41.2.23 pr. (Javolenus, 1 Letters); cf Buckland, Text-Book (n 20) 201. 
107 Zénati-Castaing & Revet, Biens (n 334) s 655. 
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D.  “QUASI-POSSESSION”: THE POSSESSION OF INCORPOREALS 
To finish this introduction, we return to the question which was put on hold at the 
very beginning: namely, “What can be the object of possession?” It was said that we 
would proceed on the assumption that these were corporeal (i.e. tangible) things: as 
Paul writes, “those things can be possessed which are corporeal”.108 For reasons that 
will be explained presently, this is indeed the only correct view. However, this has 
been doubted and, accordingly, the dissenting strand needs to be considered. 
To cut a long story short, Roman law came to recognise that some incorporeal 
things, in particular the right of usufruct, could be possessed. Thus, in the Digest, 
Ulpian states that the interdict unde vi will be available to the usufructuary if he is 
prevented from using and enjoying the thing object of his usufruct.
109
 The reason, we 
are told, is that “preventing someone from using and enjoying is held to be ejecting 
him forcibly from the usufruct”:110 the right to usus and fructus is being interfered 
with, and a remedy is granted in the form of a possessory interdict. Such possession of 
an incorporeal is referred to in some sources as quasi possessio.
111
   
Building on these fragments, the later civilian tradition broadened the doctrine 
of (quasi-) possession of incorporeals. While Germany ultimately rejected it on the 
back of the Pandectists,
112
 it was and remains recognised, at least in principle, in such 
jurisdictions as France,
113
 South Africa,
114
 and – perhaps most of all, under the 
influence of writers like Karl Ferdinand Hommel in the eighteenth century – 
Austria.
115
 A common example where the doctrine is applied would be the case of the 
tenant whose landlord has cut off the provision of gas or electricity: instead of, or as 
an alternative to, treating the tenant’s action as a contractual claim (which it 
undoubtedly is), the law will regard the possession of the right to be provided with 
these utilities as the basis for an action in rem.
116
 This is extremely puzzling, and on 
this logic it is not clear – to mention but this one issue – how the entirety of the law of 
contract is not going to be swallowed up by the law of property. More fundamentally, 
                                                        
108 D 41.2.3 pr. (Paul, 54 ad Edictum) (tr Watson Digest). 
109 D 43.16.3.13 (Ulpian, 69 ad Edictum). 
110 D 43.16.3.14 (Ulpian, 69 ad Edictum) (tr Watson Digest). 
111 e.g. D 43.16.3.17 (idem). 
112 Van Erp & Akkermans, Cases (n 14) 104. 
113 Van Erp & Akkermans, Cases (n 14) 100; Zénati-Castaing & Revet, Biens (n 334) ss 441, 448; B 
Bourinet-Parance, La possession des biens incorporels (2008). 
114 Kleyn, this volume, xxx. 
115 ABGB, § 311 (Rechtsbesitz); Van Erp & Akkermans, Cases (n 14) 106; Rüfner, this volume, xxx. 
116 Rüfner, this volume, xxx; compare Kleyn, this volume, xxx. 
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such a proposition is predicated on a misunderstanding of the relationship between a 
thing and a right. This point is important and deserves being paused on. 
As is well known, Gaius in his Institutes took the bold step of aligning 
corporeal things with rights. Among our assets, there are on the one hand things that 
“can be touched – land, a slave, clothes, gold, silver”: 117  corporeal things (res 
corporales). Then, on the other hand, there are things that “cannot be touched. They 
consist of legal rights”: incorporeal things (res incorporales).118  Thus, for Gaius, 
rights coordinated with tangible things as two types of res, in the sense of assets. 
 
Tony Thomas hailed this extension of the concept of things to encompass rights as a 
“feat of abstraction and rationalisation”. 119  It was; but the feat was incomplete. 
Starting with “clothes, gold and silver” – objects of wealth because they can be 
appropriated and traded – Gaius noted that other entities are objects of wealth too. 
Such are a usufruct or an obligation (seen from the perspective of the creditor): we are 
better off with them than without them. Rights, both in rem and in personam, are 
assets.  
What Gaius failed to perceive, however, is that the reasoning can and should 
be carried further. For, if we look at Gaius’ list of intangible res, or rights, there is one 
that is conspicuously missing: ownership itself. It is easy to see why: had Gaius said 
that his assets consisted of the cow Daisy, a usufruct over Blackacre, a right that 
Primus should pay him thirty and the ownership of Daisy, he would have counted his 
cow twice. A tangible thing and the right of ownership therein are practically 
undistinguishable. But, analytically, it is the right of ownership which should be 
aligned with the other rights: the usufruct over Blackacre stands level with the 
ownership of Daisy, not with Daisy herself (who is incommensurable). We need to 
carry through to its logical conclusion Gaius’ magisterial intuition, that rights too are 
valuable: in reality, only rights are valuable. Daisy has no value in herself; it is 
because the law protects the relationship I have over her when I claim that she is 
mine, and allows me to trade it, that this relationship (in law, a right of ownership) is 
valuable.  
                                                        
117 Gai 2.13 (tr Gordon & Robinson); cf J 2.2.1. 
118 Gai 2.14 (tr Gordon & Robinson); cf J 2.2.2. 
119 J A C Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (1976) 126 cited in Kleyn, this volume, xxx. 
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All my assets, therefore, consist of rights. But rights themselves are not 
owned. Nor are they possessed. Ownership is a right, and so is possession if we 
accept the above analysis: ownership, possession, usufruct, obligation, etc., are legally 
protected relationships, whether with a thing or a person. The metaphor is that of a 
leash in my hand, which at the other end is tied around a res or around someone else’s 
neck. But to describe my holding them in my hand, another word is needed. It cannot 
be ownership, which is already used to describe a type of leash; a fortiori can it not be 
possession. George Gretton has suggested “titularity”:120 I am the titular of the rights. 
The drawback of this phrase is that there is no active verb to indicate the 
corresponding act. “Holding” is a possibility: I hold rights in my hand. The 
fundamental point is that, whereas rights can be varied, there is only one type of 
relationship I can have with “my” rights: I hold them. I can no more possess them 
than I can own them or have a usufruct over them. The possession of rights is an 
analytical impossibility, and prefacing the alleged possession with the word “quasi” 
can do nothing to rescue it. Despite Ulpian and his misguided heirs, there is no such 
thing as the possession of incorporeals.
121
  
                                                        
120 G Gretton, “Ownership and its objects”(2007) 71 Rabels Zeitschrift 802 at 834. 
121 Part of the difficulty with Gaius’ analysis is that, from a modern perspective, we are happy to 
recognise the existence of incorporeal things other than rights: in other words, intangible things in 
which rights reside. For example, a product of the intellect can be the object of rights, independently of 
any physical manifestation it might have. In that sense, which is not Gaius’, things (items of wealth) 
can indeed be incorporeal. These can certainly be owned, but it is difficult to see how they could 
meaningfully be said to be possessed: how can one be “sitting over” something that cannot be 
physically located? Unless perhaps we accept that we can possess things which exist in our mind: 
should this difficulty be overcome, the final sentence would simply need to be rewritten as “there is no 
such thing as the possession of rights”.  
